I agree that the Jones Act is bad policy, but this inference is sloppy.
Using a 4x increase in Gulf-to-West-Coast shipments during a temporary waiver as evidence of normal suppressed demand ignores the obvious confounder: the waiver occurred during an Iran/Hormuz-related energy shock. Given the West Coast’s exposure to imported crude and refined-product supply chains, a surge in alternate Gulf supply is exactly what one would expect in a crisis.
That does not vindicate the Jones Act. It probably condemns it more narrowly: the law makes U.S. logistics less flexible when flexibility matters most. But that is different from proving the waiver-period volume reflects ordinary demand that was sitting there all along.
As a paying subscriber, I expect better causal discipline than this.
While you are probably correct on the criticism of the example used, The Jones Act is indefensible as maritime or economic policy. I cant speak to the circumstances at its time of passage, but the time for repeal passed decades ago
I agree that the Jones Act is bad policy, but this inference is sloppy.
Using a 4x increase in Gulf-to-West-Coast shipments during a temporary waiver as evidence of normal suppressed demand ignores the obvious confounder: the waiver occurred during an Iran/Hormuz-related energy shock. Given the West Coast’s exposure to imported crude and refined-product supply chains, a surge in alternate Gulf supply is exactly what one would expect in a crisis.
That does not vindicate the Jones Act. It probably condemns it more narrowly: the law makes U.S. logistics less flexible when flexibility matters most. But that is different from proving the waiver-period volume reflects ordinary demand that was sitting there all along.
As a paying subscriber, I expect better causal discipline than this.
While you are probably correct on the criticism of the example used, The Jones Act is indefensible as maritime or economic policy. I cant speak to the circumstances at its time of passage, but the time for repeal passed decades ago